

## CAUCASIAN CHALLENGES FOR THE EU

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In the emerging puzzle, which steadily outlines the borders of the changing world in the last few years, the main actors in the new geopolitical space are more and more the same – The European Union, The United States and the Russian Federation. Their relationships, political priorities and accents inevitably affect the others sectors of the scheme. The war against world terrorism, declared after 11 September 2001, not only stimulates the processes of military-political and economic differentiation, but also increases the importance of the strategic resources. The fifth expansion of the European Union, the rise in the number of the NATO members in the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as well as the increasing in the last years energy, respectively political power of Russia, determine the regional parameters of the changes. The Eurasian space, which includes Central Asia, Caucasus and sometimes the Balkans, turns out to be the buffer zone, concentrating in itself both the weakness and unpredictability of its own elements, as well as the energy and active strategies of the power states. In recent years words like ‘energy systems’ and ‘pipes’ have had magical powers on all political and economic forums outlining the accents in the political everyday life in the small and power countries in regional and global scale. The oil and gas fields and transport corridors outline the new stratification in the geopolitical puzzle of the new world.

The geographical factor in this aspect is vital and crucial element of the plans for strategic overpowering. After the string of geopolitical and economic changes in Central, Eastern Europe and in the post-soviet space, Caucasus is ever more increasing its chances for maximal use of its geographical location. Its importance for actors such as EU and the USA is also determined by their need for diversification of the energy supplies in order to decrease the dependence from the oil, produced in the Persian Gulf.

After the collapse of the soviet system in the early 90s of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the Caucasian area is separated in two self-dependent entities – North Caucasus within the Russian Federation and South Caucasus (Transcaucasia) with three sovereign factors – Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Despite the legal independence of the two geopolitical zones, the problems and processes go through them, increasing the symbiosis of the national-ethnic and politically-economic sectors. South Caucasus is becoming a special territory, which concentrates the attention and actions of the regional and global players. Going into the sphere of the independent international entities, the states in the region enter their own system of dynamic counteractions.

The Caucasian region is also terminologically interpreted as part of the so called ‘Great Black Sea Region’, which in geopolitical and geo-economic plan includes the six coastal countries – Ukraine, Russia, Georgia, Turkey, Bulgaria and Romania, as well as Armenia, Azerbaijan and Moldova. In this context the Black

Sea Region is no more interpreted as the European periphery (especially after the joining of Bulgaria and Romania in the EU from 1 January 2007), but as a uniting link of the Caspian Sea – Black Sea – Europe axis. It is now ‘an axis with constantly increasing geopolitical importance in the expanded European Union’<sup>1</sup>.

In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the Black Sea – Caspian region is turning into a special border in the Eurasian area. Even more, it is a zone of intercultural (inter-civilization) relationship which does not correspond with the determined and recognized state borders.

For the states in the European Union the Caucasian region is a strategic bridge connecting the continent with the Middle East, Central Asia and the more remote regions in the South-East Asia and China. The European strategic interests define the EU positions, pointed at the solution of all conflicts and the establishment of stability and security in the region. Europe is pursuing its interests through different organizations, of which the following three are standing out:

- ✓ The first one is the Minsk Group, which acts as an agency in the solving of the Karabakh conflict.
- ✓ The second one is the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which in recent years has become more active in the region and is acting mostly through representatives in the respective South-Caucasian states and observers on the different levels in each of them.
- ✓ The third one is NATO, which has now become a significant factor of the geopolitical life and is one of the main elements of the security mechanisms in South Caucasus<sup>2</sup>.

The Black Sea Economic Cooperation (BSEC), created in July 1992 in Istanbul, which on 5 June 1998 in Yalta was formed as Organization for Black Sea Economic Cooperation (OBSEC)\* is showing clearer ambitions for active economic presence in the region. The states members of OBSEC with population of 330 million are a huge potential market. Rich in natural resources, good production bases and qualified workforce, the region is forming a wide range of possibilities for the world economic community. It is not an accident that the dialogue between OBSEC and EU is so active and that France, Germany, Austria, Egypt, Israel, Italy, Poland, Slovakia, Tunisia, the Conference for the energy charter\* and the Black sea Club have the status of observers for OBSEC. The Organization of United Nations (UN) also includes OBSEC in its regional accents of global policy, giving it the status of an UN observer. Dependent on OBSEC is also the Russian diplomacy, for which the Organization is a constructive alternative for the politicized informal union of the states from the Black Sea – \*Baltic region. Turkey is also showing a motivated interest in the multi-aspect

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\* Member states of the OBSEC are Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine

activity of the organization. Through OBSEC Moscow and Istanbul outline a buffer zone, on which to defend their presence and influence.

We cannot eliminate the expert predictions, defining the Black Sea region as the scene of ‘serious encounters in the 21<sup>st</sup> century, caused by the problems of identity, security, democratic values, oil and migrations’<sup>3</sup>.

The numerous participants in the Caucasian processes, regardless of their long-term interests or conjunction configurations, are more or less dependent on the increasing instability in the region. The Caucasian integrity as a term and a process is going through many different modifications in the post-soviet era. The reestablished importance of the Caucasian region as a transport-energy corridor after the Cold War is more and more increasing the dependence of these two problems (integrity and corridors) in the plans and strategies of the interested regional and global subjects. They are in the core of the challenges the European Union encounters in its efforts to turn into a stabilizing sector in the Black Sea – Caspian area.

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In the last decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century the European Union was forming as one of the main factors in the Caucasian processes. The European accents are on the socio-economic sphere and on providing stability in the region, which go through keeping the ‘European standards’ in the area of human rights and democratic freedom. In December 1991 the Union acknowledged the independence of the three Caucasian republics and three years later the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE) discussed the perspectives for relationships with them. In 1995 the Council of the EU passes a project ‘for common position’ for the states in South Caucasus, in which it underlines the need of comprehensive aid to these states for the development of democratic institutions. Declaring its adherence to the universal democratic values, the EU turns out to be unprepared to conceive and comprehend the ethno-cultural particularities and traditions of Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan.

Each of the three countries seeks and receives proofs for its European nature. In this tacit competition the indisputable first place goes to Georgia, which in the past 20 years has declared, and more importantly, has been supported by the EU in its European position. In 1997 the Georgian parliament passes ‘A conception for strengthening the stability of social life, state sovereignty and security, reestablishing the territorial entirety of Georgia’, in which the constructive role of the European institutions is in opposition to the ‘imperial’ policy of the Russian Federation. In 1999 the president E. Shevardnadze proclaimed the European policy of Georgia for one of the priorities in the foreign policy of the state. In the same year the state is accepted as a member of the Council of Europe despite the two unsolved inter-ethnic conflicts, which acknowledges its ‘European’ democratic nature. In this period Shevardnadze paid an official visit to Germany where his contribution as a Minister of Foreign Affairs of the USSR from the times of the

‘perestroika’ were highly valued and he was named one of the ‘architects of united Europe’ and of the ‘new thinking’. After 2003 his successor Mikhail Saakashvili continued the intensive dialogue with Brussels. In it prevailing is the discontent of the Georgian president with the numerous promises, but few things actually done by Brussels<sup>4</sup>

The relationship between the EU and Armenia are also a complex one, despite the fact that it is the first of the three Caucasian republics which as early as 1996 receives the status of a special invitation in PACE. In the next years, however, Armenia was subjected to numerous criticisms for the ‘non-European’ political style of ruling (increase of authoritarian trends in home policy and lack of flexibility in regulating the Nagorno-Karabakh problem). The Armenian political elite accentuated on the efforts of the European structures to impose external to the Armenian society visions (attitude of tolerance towards sexual minorities and untraditional religious groups).

The relationship between the EU and Azerbaijan have been going in the same direction. The representatives of the European structures inevitably notice the omissions and mistakes in the political processes in this republic, connected to the numerous fact of violation of the legislation and misuse by the clerical apparatus at all levels of power. This does not bother much the Azerbaijani leaders who are constantly underlining the need of increasing the integration in the EU in all areas. In the first years of the 21<sup>st</sup> century the European Union showed serious intentions for active participation in the dynamic processes in the Eurasian area. A proof for this is the passed in 2004 program ‘Expanded Europe: new neighbors’. The aim pursued via this program by the EU is connected with:

- ✓ More active participation in the political and economic processes in the region;
- ✓ Creating in a long-term perspective a zone for free trade for ‘reaching full economic integration with the EU’;
- ✓ Preventing the creation of new separating lines between the expanded Union and its neighbors, as well as providing the Caucasian states with the opportunity to participate in different activities of the EU through political, economic, cultural and security cooperation;
- ✓ The perspective of including Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in the European market with estimated population of 500 million;
- ✓ The privileged relations with neighbors, based on the mutual agreement regarding the principal common activities in the sphere of legislation, effective state management, respect to human rights, including minorities, development of market economy and guaranteed progress. The EU keeps the right to define the borders of relations with the new neighbors through the prism of the level of efficiency of the common values accepted and applied in their societies<sup>5</sup>.

The aim of the EU is to prevent the creation of new separating line in Europe. To protect itself within the framework of new borders, the Union is seeking different forms and ways to increase the stability in geographical Europe.

The Strategy for European security, passed by the Council of Europe in December 2003 clearly defines South Caucasus as one of the regions where the EU has to have 'stronger and more active interest'. Declared one of the main priorities of the European Union, it becomes a very important subject.

Through the use of the existing mechanisms and the launch of the new Instrument for European Neighborhood and Partnership (IENP), the EU expects to increase border and international cooperation.

The idea is through IENP:

- ✓ To develop a progressive economic integration and deepen the political cooperation between the EU and the partner states.
- ✓ To study the specific possibilities and problems, due to geographical closeness and community of the EU and its neighbors;
- ✓ To finance 'combined programs' between the states-members and states-partners which have common borders; They do not have to be part of the border projects, but have to include regional programs with more states-partners<sup>6</sup>

The main element of the European policy towards the new neighbors is differentiation, which allows individual partnership, regarding the geographical parameters, political and economic situation, current relations between the EU and other countries from the region, as well as the level of realization of the reform programs<sup>7</sup>.

Unanimous is the opinion of experts and analysts that with this policy in the Caucasian region the European Union is in fact forming as a self-contained geopolitical power, able to affect the political map of the region regarding its visions and plans for one or another country. However, the estimates for the elimination of Russia from the European program for new neighbor policy are different. On one hand there is a disagreement with the unsolved by Moscow problems: lack of 'full democracy', existing breach of basic rights and freedoms for citizens and the Chechen problem. The second moment has to be sought in the willingness of Brussels to regulate the serious Caucasian problems at a European level. This means an opportunity for strong positions in the region, allowing Brussels to participate in the playing of the Caucasian solitaire<sup>8</sup>.

The European plans, however, remain more in the sphere of good will. The discontent with the lack of real results from the realization of the ambitious, full of good will intentions plans of Brussels can be noticed in both camps. Indicative is the position of the leader of the Georgian foundation for strategic and international

research Alexander Rondeli, according to whom the logic of the European commission for the Caucasian perspectives is not perfect. He is positive that the more quickly Europe activates in the region, the better for them [Georgians – N.D.] This will be good for Europe as well, because it is seeking expansion<sup>9</sup>.

The policy of Berlin is becoming more and more energetic regarding the processes in Caucasus. Regarding its chairmanship of the EU from 2007 Germany since the spring of 2006 has criticized seriously this aspect of the Brussels activities. The German political elite is still defending the thesis that united Europe has to fight more actively for influence in the region where today Russia and the USA are competing. As early as April 2006 the German press cited government sources, according to whom a ‘new Eastern policy of the EU’ was being developed with central direction Caucasus as a ‘new neighborhood region’.

In the summer of 2006 the German variant of the new policy of the EU becomes clear in a document named ‘Neighborhood Plus Policy’, developed by the department for policy planning at the German Foreign Affairs Ministry. Export of democracy and stability to Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan is envisioned in it. The next country in this list is Belarus, but only after ‘certain preconditions are fulfilled’, i.e. after change of power<sup>10</sup>.

An important aspect of the German chairmanship is revealed by the federal chancellor of Germany Angela Merkel. According to her ‘The European Union has to prefer closer cooperation with the new states to the perspective of them entering the organization’<sup>11</sup>. In the first half of 2007 Berlin is successfully developing this policy in both the Union itself and in relations with the main actors in Caucasus – the USA and Russia. Similar position is held also by Portugal, the successor of Germany as a chairman of the European Union. The presence of Brussels in the Caucasian processes inevitably includes participation in the negotiations between the confronting Caucasian subjects. The protection of the Caucasian integrity and disagreement with the use of another weapon in the problem solving but the diplomatic means of dialogue and tolerance are constantly defended in such negotiations. The disagreement of the EU with the economic and psychological extortion by Russia towards Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia and Azerbaijan could, however, can hardly cause a military confrontation in the region or between Brussels and Moscow. The increasing dependency on the Russian energy system forces the West to go round or soften a big part of its discontent with the actions of Kremlin in the Black Sea – Caspian area.

This fact is concluded in the analytical article of *Washington Post*, dedicated to the meeting between the Russian and American presidents in the USA in July 2007<sup>12</sup>. The article also states that Kremlin is strengthening its strategic domination over the energy supplies for Europe, while the efforts of the USA to encourage the variety of energy sources for Europe are unsuccessful and chaos is ruling in the EU energy policy<sup>13</sup>. The increased dependency on energy supplies and channels,

dominated by Russia, leads to a feasible chance for Moscow to exercise significant political influence on Europe. Despite their impressive words, the actions of the Europeans and Americans are still weak and not purposeful, notes the *Washington Post*. According to the author of the article A Karatniski there are two well-grounded reasons for optimism – the willingness of Poland, Ukraine, Lithuania and Azerbaijan to decrease the dependency of Europe from Russia and the Russian presidential campaign.

However, fears still remain.

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In the beginning of the 21<sup>st</sup> century Caucasus becomes a kind of a barometer for the positions of the global and regional actors in the international stratification, outlining the dynamics of the processes in the Eurasia area. This is becoming more apparent especially after the ‘rose revolution’ in the end of 2003 in Georgia, which was the beginning of the ‘second collapse’ of the Soviet Union. The attempt for a dramatic change in some of the post-soviet republics such as Georgia and Ukraine through change of the political elite transforms the political vocabulary but does not lead to glaring results.

This, however, widens the range of possibilities and alternatives for some new configurations in the Caucasian buffer zone. In times when increasing dependency on strategic resources and increasing importance of the Black Sea – Caspian area in the plans of the regional and global actors, the participation models are multiplied through the prism of the motivated, but dependent on the conjuncture ambitions. Each player in the Caucasian solitaire is in with their own aims outlining the borders of their strategies. They are, however, subordinate to two main, interdependent factors, determining the current accents of the Caucasian presence in the geopolitical and geo-strategic projections – the disputed integrity of the South Caucasian states and the control on the fields and energy resources and their transportation routes. The ‘unrecognized states’ or the so called ‘frozen conflicts’ in the Caucasian region are turning into one of the main factors which determine the accents in the Caucasian dynamics. The term ‘unrecognized states’ is implied part of the numerous analyses and scenarios related to the dynamically changing political picture in the Caucasian region. The modernization of the Ferdinand Lassal’s formula, especially the part on the ‘factual’ constitutional right<sup>14</sup>, allows us to search for the outlines of this term. However, the problem is multiplied by the circumstance that in the era of the global post-modernism, which came after the collapse of the Yalta-Potsdam world, the parameters of the new world order are still incomprehensible. This means that the criteria for the recognition or (not recognition) of every entity for an independent state are not clear. The historical development of Caucasus shows a narrow relationship between the religious component and the non-religious ones, which have a significant influence on the forming of the ‘values, rules, institutions and ways of

thinking’\* of the different socio-cultural communities in the region. These stand out amongst the main identification blocks:

- The ethnic one (principle of ‘blood’), beginning at blood-related level of identification (types\* and clans), through the sub-ethnic to the super-ethnic (Turk world, Slavic world);
- Over-ethnic (Soviet community, Russian community, regional over-ethnic community: Caucasians, southerners, etc.);
- The national-state (identifying with a certain state and loyalty outside dependence on ethnic or religious belonging);
- Economic-cultural (nomads and settled population, mountaineers and people living in the valleys);
- Attitude towards traditions and innovations, self-identification with the traditional society or its modernization process.

The impossibility to order the identification elements in the Caucasian area by their level of importance does not change the fact that in each specific case the determining element is restricted in the sphere of ethnicity, religion or economy. In Caucasus, both in the past and in its contemporary development, there are a lot of examples where the ethnic belonging or loyalty to different states becomes a reason for confrontation between nations with the same religion, and the religious belonging confronts the representatives of a certain ethnic group or unites people, speaking different languages.

Shortly after gaining their independence, the new sovereign states of the ex-USSR, convert the principle of rights of nations of self-identification to the principle of the territorial entity. ‘Restriction and confrontation’ are replaced by ‘national building’, which receives its specific form in the ethno-political conflicts, growing into (especially in South Caucasus) in a ‘hot phase’. The opinion of the Georgian expert Alexander Rondeli that this result is a consequence of the fact that the elites of the new subjects in South Caucasus are not prepared to face the challenges of the contemporary state building is well-grounded. ‘South Caucasus was a periphery of the Russian Empire, but it was more intrinsically related to the rest of the world than the post-soviet Azerbaijan, Armenia and Georgia, which quickly turned into sovereign states’<sup>15</sup>.

The center of the new identity is ‘own’ land. The native land in Caucasus is perceived as a sacred thing, as something perfect regardless of its economic or geopolitical values. The ethnic suspiciousness and prejudices are transformed into long-lasting conflicts only when the territory, or the ‘soil’ focus the attention of

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\* By S. Huntington criteria

\*\* Type (in Arab language – gang) is a group, circle, society of people. Until the penetrating of the Islam in the communities of the North Caucasus [mainly in Chechen - N.D.] the word ‘vaur’ was used, it corresponded to the word ‘kin’. The Chechen type is a group of people or families who have the same personal rights and are related by blood on the paternal side. The type is in the basis of the whole organization of the Chechen society.

the respective community. As in the collapse of every other continental empire, in the new independent states there are disputable territories which different ethnic communities claim their 'own'. These contradicting territorial claims are in the core of conflicts such as the South-Ossetian and the Abkhazian in Georgia, the Nagorno-Karabakh one between Armenia and Azerbaijan, the Pridnestrovie in Moldova, etc. At a later stage of the process development the ideologist of separation movements use various arguments proving pursuits and discrimination. The aim is to strengthen the separatist feelings in the respective regions and to give a better image of the position in question before the international community. The problem is that in the contemporary communities such positions are perceived only through the prism and language of 'minority rights'.

The existence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia in their present form is a proof for the inefficiency of the ethno-political model of post-soviet Georgia. The most dynamically developing unrecognized state in the Caucasian region – Nagorni Karabakh is an evidence for the political imperfection of the independent Azerbaijan, which loses not only the Karabakh land, but also its full sovereignty over five regions and partly this over another two regions. The Armenian-Azerbaijani contradictions, as well as the chosen by Georgia ethno-centric model for development restrict the possibilities for the three independent states in South Caucasus for maneuvers in the European and American political theatre. The incorporation of the unrecognized entities is a priority task for Georgia and Azerbaijan and a kind of an entry ticket to the 'civilized world'. The main problem is in the false start of the South-Caucasian republics in the period of the post-soviet fragmentation. With the cancellation of the South-Ossetian autonomy in Georgia and the annulment of the status of Karabakh, Tbilisi and Baku started the secession in the region. The institutionalization of the unrecognized states has actually started with the elimination of the autonomy status of South Ossetia and Nagorno-Karabakh autonomy area (NKAE) within Georgia and Azerbaijan. The idea of national-state succession which is in the core of the 'renaissance project' defines the legality of the post-soviet Georgia and Azerbaijan. It plays a crucial role in the appearance of the unrecognized states for which unitary Georgia and Azerbaijan do not turn into their 'own'.

Moreover, in recent years there has been a kind of stagnation in the state-legal parameters of Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorni Karabakh in the context of the South-Caucasian status quo. More and more the question of their future is restricted in the framework of the numerous discussions, consultations and in their inclusion as a significant part of different configurations of regional and international levels. The presence of Brussels in the Caucasian processes inevitably includes participation in the negotiation processes between the Caucasian subjects of confrontation. In them they are constantly defending the protection of the Caucasian integrity and the disagreement with the use of a weapon other than the diplomatic means of dialogue and tolerance for solving the problems. 'The zone is a very important transportation region for carbohydrates (from the Caspian pool)'

an official of the EU has said. ‘We do not want to replace the existing framework for problem solving or the so called ‘frozen conflicts’, but we hope that the regional cooperation will have a better comprehension. A possible solution out of the created stalemate is the initiative of the European Commission for new European policy of cooperation in the spheres of trade and security between the Black Sea states, known as ‘The Black Sea Synergy’. The main player in the region, Russia, which has a naval fleet on the Crimean Peninsula, is already against such a scheme, the EU OBERVER in Brussels says. It is for a reason that Vladimir Chizhov, the ambassador of Russia in the EU compares the contemporary ‘**Black Sea Synergy**’ to a previous project under the presidency of Germany in 1990 – the pact for stability in South-East Europe, which ‘began very loudly’ but ‘shortly after dropped’, under bureaucracy and disputes over the texts on the Ottoman Empire in the history schoolbooks.

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The European Union is still insisting on active participation in the Caucasian processes. The dynamics of the recent months outline the change in the challenges and stratification at a regional and global scale. The increasing energy power of Moscow, numerous attempts of new and old members of the EU and the USA in the search for new transportation schemes for decreasing the dependency on Moscow have a significant influence on the traditional framework and actions of Brussels. More and more often the voices of the presidents of Poland and Lithuania are heard, as well as those of Georgia and Azerbaijan in solving the important European and Eurasian problems. They are also in unison with the constant engagement of the Caucasian and Balkan processes through the search for diversification transport corridors for oil and gas, which strengthen the geographical factor in the international relations, in particular in solving the Caucasian processes. The challenges of the Black Sea – Caspian region still remain, which determines the numerous traps that the EU has to overcome on its road to establishing stability within the European borders as well as to reaching positive solutions of the problems of its new neighbors.

<sup>1</sup> EU Commission, Press Release, IP/01/1531, Brussels.

<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/01/1531&format=HTML&aged=1&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> 31.10.2001

<sup>2</sup> Карабах как фактор региональной стабильности. Два „да” и два „нет” региональная безопасность Закавказья - иллюзии, реальность, перспективы. <http://www.karabagh.am/GlavTem/13KarFaktorRegStab.htm>

<sup>3</sup> Tisdall S. Interests and Aspirations Clash in Region of Frozen Conflicts // Guardian. – 2005. - February 8.

<sup>4</sup> Саакашвили критикует ЕС. <http://www.day.az/print/news/georgia/31749.html>. 21.09.2005; Саакашвили торопит ЕС с введением безвизового режима с Грузией. 28. 02. 2007

<sup>5</sup> Kamarainen H. EU and its new neighbors. Focus on the South Caucasus. // Harvard Black Sea Security Program. 2005. P. 56. Хари Камарайнен е съветник на специалния представител на ЕС за Южен Кавказ.

<sup>6</sup> Ibidem

<sup>7</sup> O'Rourke. B. EU plans for Caucasus. RFE/RL.

<sup>8</sup> de Waal T. IWPR. EU could assume Caucasus peacekeeping role.

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<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=16046&nav1=1&nav2=2&nav3>  
2. 31.05.06

<sup>9</sup> Caucasus excluded from EU outreach

<http://www.res.ethz.ch/news/sw/details.cfm?ID=6100&nav1=1&nav2=2&nav3=2>

<sup>10</sup> ANALIZI. ZR0837AN. 004. 09.08.2006

<sup>11</sup> Angela Merkel's EU plans. <http://kosmopolit.wordpress.com/2006/11/16/angela-merkels-eu-plans/>. 16.11.2006

<sup>12</sup> Karatnycky A. Escaping Putin's Energy Squeeze. The Washington Post. 2.07.2007

<sup>13</sup> Ibidem

<sup>14</sup> Неновски Н., Г. Бойчев и др. Философия, социология, обща теория на правото. София. С. 275 и сл.

<sup>15</sup> Рондели Ал. Южный Кавказ и Россия. // Вестник Европы 2002, №7-8